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The Pennsylvania Eminent Domain
Code: A Bittersweet Nostrum for
the Residential Tenant
I. Introduction
The power of eminent domain,' if vigorously exercised, is a dev-
astating device. It is an inherent right of the sovereign,2 but tradi-
tionally the legislature has delineated its exercise.3 Every state limits
the operation of eminent domain by adhering to the constitutional
requirement of "just compensation."4 The scope of "just compensa-
tion," measured by common, statutory, and constitutional law, de-
fines the procedural and substantive rights of the condemnor5 and
condemnee.6
Thrust into the eminent domain proceeding as an unwitting
condemnee, the residential tenant seeks damages for a small com-
pensable claim,7 but is burdened by a lack of legal sophistication'
and a practical inability to finance litigation expenses.9 Further dis-
advantaging the tenant, is the conflict between his interest and the
1. The power of eminent domain must be distinguished from the use of police power,
which, although resulting in a taking, injuring, or destruction of property, is not compensable
under the Pennsylvania Eminent Domain Code. Commonwealth v. Appointment of Viewers,
399 Pa. 586, 593, 160 A.2d 715, 718 (1960).
2. Lazarus v. Morris, 212 Pa. 128, 130, 61 A. 815, 816 (1905).
3. Id
4. The United States Constitution provides the standard that private property shall not
be taken for public use without just compensation. U.S. CONST. amend. V. In Pennsylvania,
just compensation is extended to cover private property taken, injured, or destroyed PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 26, §§ 1-201(1), 1-601 (Purdon Supp. 1979-80). Thus, Pennsylvania requires compen-
sation for both direct and consequential damages.
5. "'Condemnor' means the acquiring agency, including the Commonwealth of Penn-
sylvania, taking, injuring, or destroying private property under the authority of law for a pub-
lic purpose." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-201(3) (Purdon Supp. 1979-80).
6. " 'Condemnee' means the owner of a property interest taken, injured, or destroyed,
but does not include a mortgagee, judgment creditor, or other lienholder." PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
26, § 1-201(2) (Purdon Supp. 1979-80). A lessee is the owner of a property interest and may
therefore qualify as a condemnee. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Commonwealth, 422 Pa. 144, 221
A.2d 315 (1966).
7. See notes 51-52 and accompanying text infra.
8. The poor man enters the legal system only when his rights are clear. Valid claims
remain untried and damages unredressed because of his fear of the system. See Comment,
Court Awarded Attorney's Fees and EqualAccess to the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 636, 652-54
(1974).
9. Of all households displaced between 1973 and 1976 almost half had incomes of less
than $5,000. 7 HOUSING & DEV. REP. 333 (1979). The survey included both homeowners and
tenants.
interests of both the landlord and condemnor.'I Conceivably, how-
ever, a statutory eminent domain code can adequately protect the
residential tenant's interests while giving due consideration to the in-
terests of other condemnees and the condemnor.
In balancing the various interests, the Pennsylvania Eminent
Domain Code" supplies the residential tenant with remedies en-
forceable only through recourse to the judicial process. To test the
adequacy of these remedies, one must examine both the sufficiency
of the award and the procedure involved in its recovery.' 2 The acid
test of the Code is whether it permits the tenant a quick and simple
recovery of his just compensation.
II. Determination of the Tenant's Recovery
A. General Princiles of Just Compensation
Compensation is based on a valuation of the property interest.
Valuation, however, centers on the application of the principles of
"just compensation" for property taken, injured, or destroyed.
Though "just compensation" could be based on the value to the con-
demnor or the value to the condemnee, courts frequently utilize a
hybrid approach considering the fair market value of the property
condemned.
13
10. When a property is condemned, owners of easements, rights of way, leaseholds, and
other interests could have a compensable interest. This comment focuses on the multiple inter-
est situation concerning the landlord, as the fee simple owner, and the tenant. See notes 28-31
and accompanying text infra.
1i. See generally PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §§ 1-201 to 1-902 (Purdon Supp. 1979-80) [here-
inafter referred to as the Code].
12. The following is an outline of the Pennsylvania condemnation procedure.
To initiate a condemnation proceeding, the condemnor must file a declaration of taking,
which describes the property condemned, the title sought to be acquired, and the purpose of
the condemnation. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-402 (Purdon Supp. 1979-80). Thereafter, notice
must be sent to the condemnee, and the condemnee must file preliminary objections to the
proposed taking within thirty days after receiving notice. See notes 108-09 and accompanying
text infra.
At any time, the condemnor and condemnee may stipulate to an agreement concerning
the damages for each property interest affected. Alternatively, the parties may petition for a
hearing of the viewers or proceed directly to court. The purposes of the viewers' hearing are to
provide a forum accessible to the layman and to avoid the costly expense of litigation. See
notes 110-18 and accompanying text infra.
The decision of the viewers may be appealed by either party as a matter of right. The
appeal is a trial de novo in the court of common pleas. The Code does not establish a unique
procedure for subsequent appeals. See notes 119-26 and accompanying text infra.
13. See, e.g., Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255-57 (1933); Redevelopment Auth.
of Philadelphia v. Liebermann, 461 Pa. 208, 218, 336 A.2d 249, 255 (1975).
The "fair market value" approach reflects the value of the property both to the con-
demnor and to the condemnee. The condemnation is considered a "sale." If the property
interest condemned is a type regularly bought and sold, the test of comparable sales is used.
When the property is unique, however, a different method of valuation, replacement cost, re-
production cost, or substitute facilities cost, is used. See generally Bigham, "Fair Market
Value," "Just Compensation," and the Constitution: 4 Critical View, 24 vAND. L. REV. 63, 67-
70 (1970); Jones, Just Compensation via Fair Market Value May not Include the Kitchen Sink-
It Couldbe Noncompensable, 46 Miss. L.J. 1, 1-6 (1975); 92 HARV. L. REV. 514, 514-23 (1978).
For a discussion of the Pennsylvania definition of fair market value, see note 20 infra.
The courts have been reluctant to base just compensation on the
value to the condemnor for several reasons.' 4 First, the value to the
condemnor is difficult to ascertain. 5 Second, because the value to
the condemnor depends on his use of the property, the compensation
paid varies in no logical relationship to the common notions of value
attaching to the property. Third, dissatisfaction with the amount of
the award may cause the condemnee to pursue needless litigation.
Last, to redress perceived inequities caused by the application of the
rule, courts will discover exceptions to the rule and thereby compli-
cate the application of an already unpredictable rule.
Although the subjective value to the condemnee is a better basis
for determining just compensation, this method also entails difficul-
ties in application. Determination of the peculiar value that a con-
demnee attaches to a property interest requires the means to
quantify and ascertain a value personal to the condemnee. The sub-
jectivity of measurement causes inconsistent results, and the diffi-
culty in disproving a peculiar value alleged by a condemnee
encourages fraud.' 6
Although preferring to err on the side of the condemnee,
17
courts hold that sentimental value is noncompensable and that the
standard of valuation must be the economic value of the property
interest.' 8 Olson v. United States contains the following classic state-
ment on valuation: "[The owner] is entitled to be put in as good a
position pecuniarily as if his property had not been taken. He must
be made whole, but is entitled to no more. It is property and not the
cost that is safeguarded by state and federal constitutions."' 9 The
"fair market value" test 20 provides an objective standard and pro-
14. See, e.g., Almota Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 470,
473-74 (1973); Singer v. Oil City Redev. Auth., 437 Pa. 55, 66, 261 A.2d 594, 600 (1970) (con-
demnee should be made economically whole).
15. The value to the condemnor of many "public goods" is measured by their value to
the general public. This collective value, what those who use the public good would pay for its
use over an extended period of time, is a matter of pure speculation.
16. If X and Y own identical, contiguous plots, upon condemnation both X and Y
should receive the same amount ofcompensation. Suppose X is awarded more money that Y
becauseof the subjective value X attaches to his property. Certainly Y or future parties cogni-
zant of Yr plight will litigate and argue that their property also has an enhanced subjective
value. No basis of proof exists to prove or disprove conclusively this subjective estimation of
value. But compare PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-704 (Purdon Supp. 1979-80) (the condemnee is
qualified as an expert witness to value his property interest).
17. Three reasons for favoring the condemnee exist. First, the condemnee is forced to
relinquish his property. Second, the condemnor determines which land is to be taken. Last,
the condemnee, being in a weaker financial position than the condemnor, will suffer more
harm if not made whole. In re Apportionment of Easement for Highway Purposes, 169 Ohio
St. 291, 298-99, 159 N.E.2d 612, 617 (1959).
18. Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1933).
19. Id at 255 (emphasis supplied).
20. The Code adopts fair market value as the test for valuation and defines fair market
value as follows:
[Tihe price which would be agreed by a willing and informed seller and buyer, taking
into consideration but not limited to the following factors:
motes a consistency and predictability achieved by no other meth-
ods. Because more consistent awards limit litigation and its
consequent expense, the taxpayer or consumer, who must ultimately
pay for the condemned property, gains when courts use the fair mar-
ket value approach.
B. Multiple Interest Valuation
Condemnation of property with multiple interests2' complicates
the application of the fair market value test. In applying the test in a
multiple interest situation, courts espouse one of three techniques.
Some courts value the property as a fee simple unencumbered by
any other interests, the "unencumbered fee" rule. Other courts value
each interest separately, applying the "aggregate of interests" rule.
Still others value the property as a whole, while giving due consider-
ation to the various interests in the property. The last method is the
technique adopted by the Code.22
L "Unencumbered Fee" Method-Application of the "unen-
cumbered fee" rule presents several advantages. First, no evidence
concerning the separate interests need be heard in order to value the
property. Second, since the evidence heard is simpler, a speedier
trial results. Last, physically identical properties are valued equally.
The rule, though easy to apply, fails by considering real prop-
erty as essentially a physical entity, rather than a complex array of
interests associated .h that physical entity. Consequently, an own-
er of a property it, rest may be undercompensated. 23 Additionally,
(I) The present e of the property and its value for such use.
(2) The highe- ,dnd best reasonably available use of the property and its value for
such use.
(3) The ma Anery, equipment, and fixtures forming part of the real estate taken.
PA. STAT. AN-, /tit. 26, § 1-603 (Purdon Supp. 1979-80).
One cor nmentator argues that this definition of fair market value is an economic defini-
tion rathe"/ . an a legal one. Additionally, he criticizes the definition as contemplating a will-
ing buye- and seller, when, in fact, neither exists in a condemnation proceeding. E. SNITZER,
PENNS' YVANtA EMINENT DOMAIN § 603.1 (1965) [hereinafter referred to as SNITZER]. Never-
thele, /,the Code adequately describes fair market value. The purpose in calculating just coin-
penAtion is to legally determine the economic value of the condemnee's property interest
wjaout centering on the unique value to the condemnor or condemnee. The interests of the
hypothetical buyer and seller are simply the objective, quantifiable interests of the condemnee
and the condemnor.
21. When addressing the issue of multiple interests the courts provide tests that are easy
to repeat but difficult to apply. See, e.g., Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1933) (the
owner must be made whole but not be overcompensated); Redevelopment Auth. of Philadel-
phia v. Liebermann, 461 Pa. 208, 218, 336 A.2d 249, 254 (1975) (just compensation derives as
much content from the equitable principles of fairness as it does from the technical concepts of
property law).
22. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §§ 1-507, 1-602, 1-603 (Purdon Supp. 1979-80).
23. Consider a situation in which Xand Yown two properties that are physically identi-
cal. Y, however, rents the residence on his lot, a ramshackle, dilapidated shack, to an eccentric
billionaire at $400 per month for a term of twenty years. Without this rental Y:r property is
worthless. A buyer would pay more for Y's interest than for Xrs. The "unencumbered fee"
method, however, fails to recognize this distinction. See Garella v. Redevelopment Auth., 413
the rule provides no guide for the allocation of the award.24 There-
fore, the "unencumbered fee" method is not a viable mode of analy-
sis.
2. The '5lggregate of Interests" and Code Methods. -Both the
"aggregate of interests" approach and the Code method consider all
interests in valuation. To determine the total award under the "ag-
gregate of interests" rule the values of the various interests are deter-
mined separately and added together. The Code method requires
valuation of the whole property, considering the separate existing in-
terests. These methods avoid a multiplicity of lawsuits by requiring
that all claims of any interested parties be heard together.25 Though
some commentators criticize the use of the "aggregate of interests"
rule in certain situations, 26 when properly applied both methods
yield the same result.27
In practical application, use of the Code rule works to the detri-
ment of the residential tenant. Generally, the landlord carries the
burden of presenting evidence at trial.28 In establishing the value of
the total property, the landlord presents evidence of contract rent
and fair rental value. If the contract rent is greater than or equal to
the fair rental value of the leasehold interest, the lessee will be un-
compensated for his interest.29 If the contract price is less than the
Pa. 181, 187-88, 196 A.2d 344, 348 (1964). But compare dictum in Olson v. United States, 292
U.S. 246, 255 (1933) (the public is not required to bear the burden or compensate the benefit of
the owner's bargain).
Moreover, expert real estate appraisers, the primary source of valuation at trial, soundly
reject this method. North Side Deposit Bank v. Urban Redev. Auth. of Pittsburgh, I Pa.
Commw. Ct. 274, 277-78, 274 A.2d 215, 217 (1971).
24. The difficulties of allocation are especially pronounced in the case of a partial taking.
See generally Polasky, The Condemnation of Leasehold Interests, 48 VA. L. REV. 477, 499-523
(1962). See also note 57 infra expressly dealing with these difficulties.
The interests of all property owners must be protected, even at the expense of judicial
efficiency. See Ayala v. Philadelphia Bd. of Pub. Educ., 453 Pa. 584, 595, 305 A.2d 877, 882
(1973).
25. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-507 (Purdon Supp. 1979-80).
26. When a long-term lease has a restrictive covenant that severely limits the use of the
property its value to the lessee is correspondingly reduced. Since the owner does not have the
benefit of use and enjoyment of the land for an extended period of time, his interest is also
limited. Some commentators suggest that in this situation use of the "aggregate of interests"
method undervalues the property, but the "willing and informed" buyer takes the restrictive
lease into account and pays less for the property.
When the rent paid by the lessee exceeds the going market rate, the leasehold has a "nega-
tive value." The value of the lessor's interest is greater than the value of the entire property.
No court has yet required the lessee to pay the lessor the "negative value." Instead, the lessor's
recovery has been correspondingly reduced. Thus, the lessor's recovery does not equal the
value of his interest. The Code method produces the same result. See Polasky, supra note 24,
at 490-93; Comment, Condemnation, Compensation, and "Negative" Interests, 43 FORDHAM L.
REV. 841, 841-56 (1975).
27. See Committee on Leases, Condemnation ofLeaseholdInterests, 3 REAL PROP., PRO-
BATE, & TRUST J. 225, 232-33 (1968).
28. Id at 231. Because the residential tenant's interest is so small, the costs involved in
presenting evidence at trial may be prohibitive.
29. See notes 48-49 and accompanying text infra for a discussion of leasehold valuation.
fair market price, however, the lessee may recover the "bonus
value."3 The greater the landlord's recovery, the smaller the ten-
ant's recovery will be.3
The "aggregate of interests" rule eliminates any conflict be-
tween the landlord and tenant since the tenant's award is distinct
from the landlord's and both have an interest in establishing a higher
fair market value.32 Moreover, each party is guaranteed a hearing.
The Code incorporates several provisions that are similar in charac-
ter to the "aggregate of interests" method.33 This incorporation
clouds any simple explanation of the Code rule.
The Code fails to provide a method for allocating the award
among the multiple interests.34 Moreover, the leading Pennsylvania
case discussing the valuation of multiple interests, Garella v. Redevel-
opment Authority, 35 expressly rejects the "unencumbered fee" and
"aggregate of interests" rules without eludication or substantial justi-
fication. 36  Nevertheless, support does exist for using the Code ap-
proach. The Code method considers all owners of property interests
and postpones the difficulties of apportionment until the end of the
trial. In addition, the court, rather than the jury, determines the
technical and complex problem of allocation.
The difficulties in applying the Code rule to multiple interest
valuations can be overcome. By appointing a panel of impartial ex-
pert appraisers as viewers the separate interests could be quickly and
authoritatively evaluated. 37  On appeal their findings would be
presented as evidence.38 In addition, a clear method of allocation
30. See note 49 infra for a discussion of "bonus value."
3 1. Suppose X and Y have identical properties except that X has a tenant who pays $200
rent per month and Y has a tenant who pays only $100 per month. Further suppose the fair
rental value of either is $150 per month. Upon condemnation, the total award for all the
interests in Y's property would equal the total award for all interests in X's property. (Re-
member "negative leasehold" value). X, however, recovers more than Ybecause Y must share
the award with his tenant.
32. The landlord will recover an award based on the capitalization of fair rental value of
the leasehold or contract rent, whichever is less, plus the value of his reversionary interest. See
Polasky, supra note 24, at 490-91. The tenant has an interest in establishing "bonus value."
Bonus value occurs when the fair rental value is greater than contract rent. Therefore, the
landlord has no economic interest in preventing the tenant from establishing that the fair
rental value is greater than contract rent.
33. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-607 (Purdon Supp. 1979-80) (value of machinery,
equipment, and fixtures is separately determined if removed from the property); Id § 1-705(2)
(expert witness may testify about his separate valuation of the various property interests).
34. See generally SNITZER, supra note 20, at §§ 601-603.
35. 413 Pa. 181, 196 A.2d 344 (1964).
36. The case does not indicate any means whereby allocation can be made among the
multiple interests. The two classic methods, the "subtraction" and "ratio" methods, are ex-
amined in note 39 infra. See Polasky, supra note 24, at 477-537.
37. For a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages in using experts as viewers, see
notes 136-37 and accompanying text infra
38. Under the Code the viewers' findings have no evidentiary value on appeal. For a
description of the merits of this approach, see notes 137-38 and accompanying text infra
must be announced.39 This will lead to greater predictability in re-
sult, which in turn supplies a rational basis for deciding whether to
pursue the claim initially or whether to file a subsequent appeal.
40
C Elements of the Tenant's Compensation
I. The Leasehold Interest. -The complexities of allocation are
frequently avoided through the use of a condemnation clause, a lease
provision that defines the respective rights4 ' of the lessee and lessor
upon condemnation. Generally, the clause terminates the leasehold
interest upon condemnation, and the lessee cannot maintain an ac-
tion for the destruction of the leasehold.42 Conversely, if the lease is
not terminated, the tenant will be entitled to compensation for the
taking of his interest.43
Courts will interpret the clause in the light most favorable to the
lessee.' This is a recognition of the unequal bargaining positions of
the landlord and residential tenant45 and the harsh effect that the
39. Commentators and courts recognize two methods of apportionment. In the "subtrac-
tion" method the interest of the lessee is calculated and subtracted from the total award. The
"apportionment" or "ratio" method prorates the award between the lessor and lessee. The
variables of the proration formula, complex capitalization and expense allocation factors, are
tricky to apply and may lead to inconsistent results. Because of its simplicity, the subtraction
method is preferable. See generally Polasky, supra note 24, at 477-537.
40. At trial the landlord's and tenant's interests still conflict, but any evidence presented
is considered together with the findings of the viewers. See notes 136-38 and accompanying
text infra.
41. Residential leases, when properly drafted, contain a condemnation clause. The
clause can describe the method of allocation between the lessor and lessee upon condemna-
tion. Usually the clause is drafted to allow the lessor to recover the full award, which denies
the lessee any recovery.
The provisions of the condemnation clause should be aggressively negotiated. Unfortu-
nately, the lessee is often uninformed or in a poor bargaining position and the clauses are
written favoring the lessor. Address by Fred M. Lange, Esq., SOUTHWESTERN LEGAL FOUN-
DATION, INSTITUTION ON PLANNING, ZONING, AND EMINENT DOMAIN 289, 299 (1975).
When the condemnation clause is properly drafted much unnecessary litigation can be
avoided. The clause may answer what type of allocation method is to be used on full or partial
taking, whether the lessee must continue to pay full rent in the event of a partial taking, and
whether the lessee can collect any portion of leasehold value in the event of condemnation. If
no condemnation clause exists, the lessee must continue to pay full rent in the event of a partial
taking, but is relieved from the obligation to pay rent upon a full taking. See generally Com-
mittee on Leases, supra note 27, at 242-55; SNITZER, supra note 20, at § 201(2)-9.
42. In re Condemnation by Commonwealth of Pa., Dep't of Transp., 38 Pa. Commw. Ct.
535, 542, 394 A.2d 657, 661 (1978); cf. Boteler v. Philadelphia & Reading Terminal R.R., 164
Pa. 397, 405, 30 A. 303, 303-04 (1894) (sublessee is not bound by a condemnation clause in the
lease agreement of the lessee and lessor).
43. In re Condemnation by the Commonwealth of Pa., Dep't of Transp., 38 Pa. Commw.
Ct. 535, 542, 394 A.2d 657, 661 (1978).
44. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Faller, 399 Pa. 607, 611, 161 A.2d 6, 8 (1960).
45. The validity of the condemnation clause has been upheld in Scholl's Appeal, 292 Pa.
262, 141 A. 44 (1928). Recent case law, however, has begun to erode the validity of the clause.
The residential lease is a contract, governed by contract law. Pugh v. Holmes, - Pa....
405 A.2d 897, 903 (1979). In comparison with the landlord, the tenant has a vastly inferior
bargaining position. Id. at -, 405 A.2d at 903. Because of the tenant's weak bargaining posi-
tion, the condemnation clause strongly favors the landlord. A contract clause will be over-
turned when it imposes unreasonable liabilities or burdens upon those persons financially ill-
equipped to assume the burdens and who are without significant bargaining power. Fair v.
Negley, 257 Pa. Super. Ct. 50, 59, 390 A.2d 240, 245 (1978). Under this standard, the condem-
clause may have on the tenant if strictly construed. Special damages,
however, eliminate any hardship that may be caused by the enforce-
ment of the condemnation clause.46
Absent lease provisions barring recovery, the lessee is entitled to
just compensation for the taking, injuring, or destruction of his lease-
hold interest.47 Courts enunciate two formulas to determine just
compensation for the lessee's interest, the "fair market value"4 8
method, and the "bonus value" method.49 In practice, the methods
are interchangeable. Compensation is awarded for a partial or full
taking5° or for consequential damages to the leasehold interest.
nation clause will survive attack since the burden on the tenant is slight. In addition, when the
lease is signed, the chance of condemnation is normally insignificant. Furthermore, through
the mechanism of special damages the Code permits the tenant to recover an amount often
greatly in excess of the value of the leasehold interest.
46. Since an equitably drafted condemnation clause can limit litigation and no party
suffers significant harm because of its use, properly drafted and thoroughly negotiated con-
demnation clauses should be encouraged. The Code, consonant with Pennsylvania case law,
does encourage the use of such clauses. Because the courts interpret the clause in the light
most favorable to the tenant, the Code allocation method encourages the landlord to include a
clause that clearly protects his interest. The landlord will write a strong and clear condemna-
tion clause in an attempt to insure a maximum recovery while avoiding unnecessary litigation.
Ideally, however, the clause should protect the interests of both the landlord and tenant.
47. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-601 (Purdon Supp. 1979-80). The measure of just com-
pensation varies in theory and in practice. Compare the following: "'Just compensation'
means the full monetary equivalent of property taken. The owner is to be put in the same
position monetarily as he would have occupied if his property had not been taken." Almota
Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 470, 473-74 (1972).
"The compensation for the value of the leasehold covers the loss from premature termina-
tion except in the unusual situation where there is higher cost for present relocation than for a
future [relocation]." United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372, 379 (1946) (only in unu-
sual circumstances is loss from premature termination actually considered).
Without a statutory provision providing for relocation expenses, they are not included in
the compensation. When they are paid, though, the disruption caused by the condemnation is
less severe.
48. See Boteler v. Philadelphia & Reading Terminal R.R., 164 Pa. 397, 30 A. 303 (1894)
(the value of the leasehold is what it can be sold for on the marketplace). But see James
McMillan Printing Co. v. Pittsburgh, Carnegie, & W. R.R. Co., 216 Pa. 504, 511, 65 A. 1091,
1094 (1907) (market value is not the test of lease value since a lease rarely has a market value).
When the court correctly applies the fair market test it compensates the tenant for the
taking of the right of occupation, the right of excluding others, and the right of disposition.
Redevelopment Auth. of Philadelphia v. Liebermann, 461 Pa. 208, 213, 336 A.2d 249, 252
(1975).
49. "Bonus value" or "leasehold advantage" is the difference between the fair rental
value of the leased premises and the rent actually reserved in the lease for the remainder of the
unexpired term. The amount is discounted to present value. See Redevelopment Auth. of
Wilkes-Barre v. Santucci, 20 Pa. Commw. Ct. 376, 380, 341 A.2d 533, 535 (1975). Therefore,
the lessee whose rent is greater than the fair market value has no compensable interest unless a
statute specifies otherwise. See Pittsburgh Urban Redev. Auth. v. Cleban, 216 Pa. Super. Ct.
269, 280, 264 A.2d 187, 193 (1970).
50. In addition to a full or partial taking, the condemnor could take for a term of years.
See, e.g., United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373 (1945). This rarely occurs.
A condemnee may also be a victim of a de facto taking, which exists if the property owner
can demonstrate the existence of "extraordinary circumstances" caused by the condemnor that
have substantially deprived the owner of the beneficial use and enjoyment of his property
when no declaration of taking has been filed. Helms v. Chester Redev. Auth., 32 Pa. Commw.
Ct. 377, 378, 379 A.2d 660, 661 (1977) (evidence that the property has remained vacant for
some time and that the condemnor's plan to acquire nearby property has received publicity is
not enough to establish a de facto taking); Reingold v. Urban Redev. Auth. of Pittsburgh, 20
Pa. Commw. Ct. 266, 267-69, 341 A.2d 915, 915-16 (1975) (evidence that the city had con-
a. Full taking. -A full taking occurs when the lessee's entire
property interest is taken. The length of the unexpired term at the
time of the taking determines the extent of the compensable interest.
Thus, a tenant at will has no compensable interest,5' while a tenant
from month to month is entitled to compensation only for the right
of occupancy for the remainder of the month in which the property
is condemned.52 Thus, the typical residential tenant possesses a very
small compensable interest upon condemnation.
b. Partial taking. -A partial taking of a leasehold occurs when
only part of the property subject to the leasehold is taken. 53 In valu-
ing the interest taken, the Code requires the application of the same
general principles that are employed in the event of a full taking.54
Partial taking cases raise particular problems in the method of
payment. The Code does not specify a particular manner of pay-
ment. All three commonly used payment techniques,55 payment to
the lessee with no reduction in rent, reduction in rent coupled with
payment to the landlord, and payment held in trust56 have serious
drawbacks.5 One solution is to allow the alternative remedies of
abatement of rent or payment to the lessee. Although resolving
demned buildings surrounding Reingold's property and that because of deteriorating condi-
tions no tenants could be found to rent the Reingold property was sufficient to prove a de facto
taking). The Reingold case underscores the dilemma facing the residential tenant suing on a
theory of de facto taking. If he stays in possession, his action may be construed as a waiver of
the de facto taking. If he leaves, however, he must litigate before he receives any compensa-
tion.
The Code establishes a procedure for valuation of the interest taken and compensation
upon the condemnee's proof of a de facto taking. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 50 2(e) (Purdon
Supp. 1979-80). In a multiple interest setting the method used to allocate damages will depend
on whether the taking is full or partial.
51. Riedel v. Plymouth Redev. Auth., 361 Mass. 680, , 241 N.E.2d 852, 854 (1968);
SNITZER, supra note 20, at § 201(2)-9.
If a statute provides that the tenant at will must be given notice before termination, the
tenant has a compensable interest for the period of the notice if a condemnation occurs. The
expectancy of a continued leasehold relationship in a tenancy at will, however, is not compen-
sable. United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U S. 372, 380 (1945).
52. See Pittsburgh Urban Redev. Auth. v. Cleban, 216 Pa. Super. Ct. 269, 280, 264 A.2d
187, 194 (1970).
53. The landlord's interest may be partially taken, while the tenant's is fully taken. The
allocation problems discussed in this section apply when both the landlord and tenant suffer a
partial taking. If the tenant is forced to move, he has suffered a full taking.
54. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-602(a) (Purdon Supp. 1979-80). An exception to the
general principles is the apportionment between the landlord and tenant when the lease has a
"negative value," i.e. the fair market rent is less than the contract rent. In a full taking the
landlord absorbs the negative value. In a partial taking the lessor and lessee often share the
inadequate award on a pro rata basis. L. ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER EMINENT DOMAIN
§ 123 (1953).
55. See generally Polasky, supra note 24, at 499-511.
56. Only Massachusetts has adopted this method. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 79, §§ 24-
25 (West 1969).
57. The award is reduced to present value using an acknowledged capitalization discount
rate. If the discount rate is too low the award recipient, with adequate investment, reaps a
windfall. Conversely, if the rate is too high, a loss is incurred. The recipient of the award
carries the burden of investment. Since the award is considered as income to the recipient, an
some problems, the solution raises the specter of judicial interven-
tion in every partial taking involving a leasehold interest to deter-
mine which is the better alternative.
A second solution is to amend the trust procedure, empowering
the trustee to collect additional funds from the condemnor if defi-
ciencies occur. Any excess would be returned to the condemnor.
Unless a trustee is willing to work for nothing, however, the trust res
must still be greater than when the award is paid either to the land-
lord or to the tenant.
The best solution is to require the condemnor to assume pay-
ment of the portion of the rent abated. The condemnor is more
financially secure, will continue to be in existence for the duration of
the payments, and, in fairness, should bear all consequential costs of
condemnation. The landlord will have a sounder assurance of pay-
ment, and the tenant will be relieved of any obligation to pay for
what has been taken. No party will suffer an investment loss or reap
a windfall profit. Property law, through the mechanism of the
ground rent, provides a model for this payment scheme.
c. Consequential damages. -Consequential damages do not
arise when the property is taken, as in a full or partial taking, but
when an injury to the property occurs as the natural result of an act
by an agency empowered with eminent domain.58 When a leasehold
is damaged, the tenant may have a compensable right.59
The Pennsylvania Constitution requires that municipal and
other corporations authorized to exercise the power of eminent do-
main redress any consequential injuries caused by the exercise of this
power.6 ° In certain circumstances, the Code extends this liability to
the state and its agents.6' Unlike the "taking" situation in which the
intriguing problem is raised if tax considerations are included as a variable in calculating the
amount of the award.
In many cases, payment to the lessee is unattractive. The tenant, often the less sophisti-
cated party, is more burdened by the need to invest then the landlord. If the tenant is success-
ful his taxes increase. If he fails, his income diminishes. The landlord, however, pays higher
taxes only if his investments yield a windfall. The technique also deprives the landlord of the
security of the lease. If the tenant absconds with the funds, the landlord's only cause of action
is against the tenant.
Payment to the landlord and abatement of rent also presents problems. The landlord
must bear the risk of an inadequate return on the award. Additionally, if the risk that a
financially secure tenant would fail to pay the landlord full rent is less than the risk the land-
lord takes in investing the funds, the landlord would prefer that the tenant receive the award
and pay full rent.
The solution of holding the award in trust and investing the trust res to enable full pay-
ment to the lessor leaves unanswered the question of who bears the net loss or reaps the net
gain from the investments. Furthermore, the trustee's fees diminish the corpus available for
investment.
58. In re Soldiers' & Sailors' Memorial Bridge, 308 Pa. 487, 490, 162 A. 309, 310 (1932).
59. See, e.g., Coons v. McKees Rocks Boro., 243 Pa. 340, 90 A. 141 (1914).
60. PA. CONST. art. 16, § 8.
61. All condemnors are liable for damages to the property abutting the area of the im-
cause of action arises when the declaration of taking is filed, the
cause of action for consequential damages arises when the actual
damage occurs. 62 Problems regarding allocation of the award be-
tween the landlord and tenant similar to those encountered in partial
takings also accompany consequential damages.
2 Special Damages. -The essence of just compensation is the
adequacy of the award. To be adequate the award must be sufficient
to safeguard the varied interests of the condemnor and condemnees.
The tenant, because of an unfair bargaining position and a lack of
legal sophistication, usually enters a lease agreement that contains a
condemnation clause eradicating his interest upon a taking. The
Code encourages these condemnation clauses since litigation is di-
minished and the problems of allocation are circumvented. To re-
dress the inequity suffered by the tenant, the Code provides for
special damages that articulate compensatory and social purposes.
These special damages include a replacement housing allowance,
moving expenses or dislocation allowance, and, in limited circum-
stances, delay compensation.
a. Replacement housing allowance. -The tenant has a noncom-
pensable expectancy to have the option to renew, especially in a
month to month tenancy with an established history of peaceful oc-
cupation and timely rental payments. The Code redresses the ineq-
uity of not awarding compensation for this expectancy by providing
a replacement housing allowance63 to the qualifying tenant. To
qualify for the replacement housing allowance, the tenant must be a
provement that results from a change of grade of a road or highway, permanent interference
with access thereto, or injury to the surface support. This liability arises whether or not any
property is taken. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-612 (Purdon Supp. 1979-80). Additionally, when
a public road, street, or highway is vacated, the affected owner may recover damages for any
injuries suffered as a result thereof, even though no land is taken. Id § 1-613.
Noncompensable injury includes the loss of future trade or business, a change in the traf-
fic pattern, or the need to travel farther to reach a street going in the same direction. Iron City
Auto. Co. v. City of Pittsburgh, 253 Pa 478, 491, 98 A. 679, 685 (1916) (damage to future trade
or business is too speculative to be compensable); Commonwealth of Pa., Dep't of Trans. v.
Kasner, 13 Pa. Commw. Ct. 525, 532, 320 A.2d 146, 148 (1975) (injury caused by change in
traffic pattern too small to be compensable).
62. Commonwealth of Pa., Dep't of Transp. v. Gayeski, 21 Pa. Commw. Ct. 273, 275-76,
344 A.2d 730, 731-32 (1975). The reasons why the cause of action arises when damages occur
are threefold. First, the condemnor is given added flexibility to terminate an unwise project
without a prohibitive extension of liability. Second, before the damage occurs, it is impossible
to estimate the extent, if any, of the damage. Last, when damages are the prerequisite to
recovery, many legitimate claims may be barred by the statute of limitations.
63. Relocation housing allowance, moving expenses, and dislocation allowance are spe-
cial damages provided by the Code. The Code provisions mirror the Uniform Relocation
Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies for Federal and Federally Assisted Pro-
grams. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4601-4634 (1976). See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §§ 1-601A to 1-604A (Pur-
don Supp. 1979-80).
displaced person.' A tenant who is not a condemnee but who is
legally in occupancy of the property at the time of condemnation
may still qualify for this special allowance as a displaced person.65
Tenants not qualifying as displaced persons include a tenant holding
an expired lease at the time of condemnation66 and a tenant forced
to move by an agency acting as a private owner.67
Before he may receive the allowance, the displaced tenant must
rent or purchase a suitable dwelling.68 The tenant cannot be re-
quired to relocate in an area not readily accessible to the tenant's
place of employment and not as generally accessible to public and
commercial facilities as the former leasehold. The award is limited
to $4000.69
The replacement housing allowance is a statutory award re-
dressing the inequities tenants suffer when they receive little or no
award for the destruction of the leasehold. It is based on need or out
of pocket expense rather than being awarded as a matter of right.7"
64. 'Displaced person' means any condemnee or other person not illegally in occu-
pancy of real property who moves or moves his personal property as a result of the
acquisition for a program or project [of the acquiring agency] . . . or as a result of
written notice from the acquiring agency of intent to acquire or order to vacate such
real property ....
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-201(8) (Purdon Supp. 1979-80) (emphasis added).
65. Id This commonly occurs when the condemnation clause eliminates all of the ten-
ant's interest upon condemnation. See. notes 41-45 and accompanying text supra.
66. Fisher v. Pittsburgh Pub. Parking Auth., 433 Pa. 113, 115, 248 A.2d 849, 850 (1969).
67. Alexander v. United States Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 441 U.S. 39, - (1979)
(acquiring agency not procuring the property for a project or program).
Any extension of the definition of "displaced person," though, must be carefully consid-
ered. Cushing N. Dolbeare, president of the National Law Income Housing Coalition, advo-
cates the extension of the federal definition of a displaced person (currently the same as the
Pennsylvania definition) to include "the involuntary movement of people from dwellings be-
cause of circumstances beyond their control." 7 HOUSING & DEV. REP. 333 (1979). While
implementation of this proposal may be meritorious despite its obvious cost and the distinct
chance for fraud, its social welfare purpose is inconsistent with the purpose of the Code.. If the
proposal is incorporated in the Code, a "taking" will often occur without the exercise of the
eminent domain power.
68. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §§ 1-603(A)(a)(l), (2)(b) (Purdon Supp. 1979-80). See Patter-
son v. County of Allegheny, 15 Pa. Commw. Ct. 228, 238, 325 A.2d 484, 489 (1969).
69. The replacement housing allowance for a suitable rental unit is determined by the
following formula promulgated by the Attorney General:
1. Damages payable. . . are determined by subtracting from the amount necessary
to rent a comparable, decent, safe, and sanitary dwelling for the next four years the
following amount:
(a) 48 times the average monthly rental paid by the relocated individual or fam-
ily during the last three months; or
(b) if such monthly rental is not reasonably equal to market rentals for similar
dwellings. . . 48 times the economic rent; or
(c) if the average monthly rental being paid by a displaced person or family, not
including rent supplements paid by public agencies, exceeds 25 percent of the
monthly gross income of such person or family, 12 times the average monthly income
of such person or family.
37 PA. CODE § 151.6 (1979).
70. Potential for abuse exists in awarding recovery based on gross income since the un-
scrupulous, hoping to gain four years of cheap rent, may speculate on the possibility of con-
demnation. Those with lower incomes, however, probably will not speculate on leases.
Since a condemnation is generally unexpected, defining gross income to include the in-
Since it primarily serves a social purpose, the award is made sepa-
rately from the leasehold valuation.7'
Several deficiencies, however, erode the efficacy of the replace-
ment housing allowance. First, the displaced tenant may be forced
to move before finding an adequate replacement dwelling. 72 Second,
the Code provides no alternative to the allowance.73 Last, the Code
does not provide for a maximum coordination of state and federal
benefits,74 and the tenant may not receive a timely notification of his
rights.75
Nevertheless, these deficiencies can be remedied. With little ad-
ditional cost the tenant can be informed of all potential benefits to
which he is entitled. The tenant must not be dispossessed before he
finds an adequate replacement dwelling. Additionally, when feasi-
ble the tenant should have the option of remaining in possession.
7 6
come of all adult family members does not have the disruptive effect on the family unit of a
similar provision of a welfare law.
71. If the tenant recovers both the leasehold advantage and the replacement housing
allowance, a partial duplication of payment will exist. They are, however, distinct. The land-
lord's award will not be reduced by the payment of this special assistance to the tenant.
The Code requires the separation of special and general damages. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26,
§ 1-518(b) (Purdon Supp. 1979-80). The replacement housing allowance is a special damage.
The purpose of the allowance is not to compensate the tenant for his interest, but to help him
relocate.
If the award is not made separately from the leasehold valuation, the landlord's award,
the complement of the tenant's, varies depending on the tenant's gross income. This would
erode the concept of fair market value. To maintain a consistent definition of fair market
value, the Code provides that all special damages are considered as supplementary payments
and not as part of the general compensation for the leasehold interest.
72. To take possession the condemnor need only make an offer to pay the tenant its
estimated just compensation. If the tenant contests the award, payment will be delayed even
longer. See notes 96-101 and accompanying text infra.
No tenant should be forced to move until he has been offered an adequate replacement
dwelling. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-12-7 (1973); 5 HOUSING & DEV. REP. 1079 (1978). This
provision has the advantages of saving the condemnor storage costs (see note 102 infra), of
reducing the demoralization cost caused by the condemnation, and of guaranteeing the dis-
placed tenant a replacement dwelling. The primary disadvantage is the inability to guaranty
with certainty a time when possession can take effect. But see note 107 infra on the emergency
right to possession.
73. The primary motivation for establishing replacement housing allowances was to alle-
viate the hardship caused tenants who were forced to move during the large-scale clearance
projects of the 1950's. Currently, many projects involve rehabilitation, which does not necessi-
tate the tenant's displacement. In these situations HUD has proposed giving the tenant the
option of staying in the rehabilitated project or moving and collecting the replacement housing
assistance. See generally 5 HousING & DEV. REP. 1034-35 (1978). If this proposal is adopted
cost savings will result because fewer special damages are paid and administrative costs are
reduced. Moreover, the tenants will not suffer the trauma of relocation.
74. The Code does not establish an agency to coordinate federal and state payments as
Rhode Island provides in R.I. GEN LAWS § 37-6.1-2 (1977). The purpose of the Rhode Island
statute is to prevent duplicate payments.
75. Except in emergency situations, Oregon law requires that the "displaced person" be
informed in writing of all available benefits, federal, state, or local, to which he is entitled
before he is required to move. OR. REV. STAT. § 281.055 (1977). Regulations promulgated by
the Pennsylvania Attorney General only require that the acquiring agency inform the con-
demnee of his rights to special damages. 37 PA. CODE § 151.11. See notes 92-93 and accom-
panying text infra.
76. The suggestion that the tenant should not be dispossessed until the condemnor offers
If these changes are adopted, the replacement housing allowance will
better protect the interests of both the condemnor and condemnee.
b. Moving expenses and dislocation allowance. -Without statu-
tory authorization no right to a dislocation allowance or to moving
expenses exists.77 Under the Code the tenant has a qualified right to
recover moving expenses and to receive a dislocation allowance
whether or not the displaced tenant can recover for damages to his
leasehold interest.78 To qualify for the dislocation allowances or the
reimbursement of reasonable moving expenses, the tenant must be a
displaced person, but need not be a condemnee.79 The qualifying
tenant may then elect to be reimbursed for reasonable moving ex-
penses incurred,8 ° or in lieu of this reimbursement collect a $200 dis-
placement allowance and a moving expense allowance not exceeding
$300.1 By defining special damages in this manner, the Code refines
the meaning of "fair market value" used in valuation of the lease-
hold interest.
8 2
him an adequate replacement dwelling is thoroughly discussed in notes 96-102 and accompa-
nying text infra.
77. Delaware County Redev. Auth. v. Carminatti, 18 Pa. D. & C.2d 704, 706 (C.P. Del.
1959).
78. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §§ 1-601A(a), 1-603A (Purdon Supp. 1979-80).
Arguably, moving expenses and dislocation allowance should be considered as part of the
compensated leasehold value. The willing and informed buyer and seller consider the factors
of moving expenses and dislocation hardship in their bargain for the leasehold price, and each
lessee incurs these expenses when he moves anyway. The lessee should only be able to collect
damages over and above the leasehold valuation if it would be less expensive to move at the
expiration of the lease. Finally, payment of a fixed sum regardless of expense encourages
fraud.
Three points, however, favor the separate valuation. First, the condemnation is not an
actual sale. Dislocation demoralization is difficult to quantify. The award of the dislocation
allowance, therefore, is in the nature of a liquidated damages clause. Second, a separate award
of these damages helps blunt the effect of condemnation clauses. Last, the separate award
recognizes the unique definition of fair market value under the Code. See note 82 infra. See,
e.g., United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372 (1946) (arguing against inclusion); Hous-
ing Auth. v. Savannah, 91 Ga. 881, 87 S.E.2d 671 (1955) (favoring inclusion).
79. For a definition of condemnee, see note 6 supra See also Fisher v. Pittsburgh Pub.
Park Auth., 433 Pa. 113, 115, 248 A.2d 849, 850 (1969); Redevelopment Auth. of Wilkes-Barre
v. Santucci, 20 Pa. Commw. Ct. 376, 380, 341 A.2d 533, 535 (1975).
80. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-601A(a)(l) (Purdon Supp. 1979-80).
The moving expense provision in the old Pennsylvania Eminent Domain Code required
that the court consider both the distance moved and the total amount of money expended in
determining reasonableness. Additionally, the expenses could not exceed the fair market value
of the personal property. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-610 (repealed 1971).
Under the present Code any move of fifty miles or less is presumed reasonable. The
displaced person has the burden of proving that a move greater than fifty miles is reasonable.
37 PA. CODE § 151.4(2) (11). No absolute ceiling is .set on the total amount of damages.
81. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-601A(a)(2) (Purdon Supp. 1979-80).
The new Code approach is a vast improvement over the old approach. For small claims
the qualifying tenant can collect the displacement and moving expense allowance without be-
coming embroiled in a time-consuming process of proving expenses. The condemnor saves the
costs of investigating and defending these small claims. In addition, the focus of reasonable-
ness does not turn on the difficult and volatile issue of the fair market value of the personal
property, and the distance presumption eases the tenant's burden of proof.
82. By distinguishing between property value and damages to the condemnee, the Code
provides for a separate valuation of the property based primarily on real estate appraisal tech-
c. Delay compensation. -The date from which delay compen-
sation is calculated is determined by the viewers. 83 Formerly, inter-
est accrued from the date of filing until the date the award was paid
to the condemnee. 84 Under the Code no interest accrues on the
funds paid on account or into the court8" or on special damages.
86 If
the condeninee is entitled to delay compensation and has a compen-
sable interest and the condemnor has not paid the condemnee esti-
mated just compensation or paid a like amount into the court, no
delay compensation can accrue and no rent is due.87 The tenant is
entitled to delay compensation only upon relinquishment of posses-
sion.88 Therefore, if the tenant stays in possession, he is not entitled
to delay compensation and rent is due.89
III. Procedure In Gaining Recovery
The condemnee's interests are best protected if the award is suf-
ficient in amount and can be easily obtained. If the award is too
easily acquired, however, excessive or fraudulent claims will invaria-
bly be made. Thus, the procedure must balance the ease of recovery
against the chance of fraud to equitably weigh the interests of both
the condemnor and the condemnees. Because the essence of the
process is the taking of property, the procedure must satisfy the due
process requirements of notice and opportunity to be heard.9"
A. Elements of Notice.
To fulfill the requirements of due process, notice "must be rea-
sonably calculated under all circumstances to apprise the interested
niques. Thus, the Code does not work the condemnee an injustice since special damages are
separately valued and awarded. Payment of special damages, therefore, allows a more objec-
tive estimation of leasehold value by the landlord, tenant, and condemnor.
83. Delay compensation is interest awarded on limited circumstances for delay in pay-
ment of the compensation by the condemnor. If awarded, the interest is calculated at a rate of
6% per annum. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-611 (Purdon Supp. 1979-80).
84. See, e.g., Kelly v. Allegheny County Redev. Auth., 411 Pa. 210, 213, 191 A.2d 393,
394 (1963); Scott v. Stewart, 44 Pa. D. & C. 174, 178 (C.P. Dauph. 1941).
85. PA. STAT. ANs. tit. 26, § 1-611 (Purdon Supp. 1979-80).
86. See Pittsburgh Urban Redev. Auth. v. Cleban, 216 Pa. Super. Ct. 269, 264 A.2d 187
(1970); Redevelopment Auth. of Chester v. Swager, 12 Pa. Commw. Ct. 437, 316 A.2d 136
(1974). See generally SNITZER, supra note 20, at § 611-2.1.
87. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, comment to § 1-611 (Purdon Supp. 1979-80).
88. Pittsburgh Urban Redev. Auth. v. Cleban, 216 Pa. Super. Ct. 269, 278, 264 A.2d 187,
192 (1970).
89. Id
90. The seminal case involving due process and the deprivation of property in a civil
proceeding is Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950), wherein the
Court stated as follows:
Many controversies have raged about the cryptic and abstract words of the Due Proc-
ess Clause, but there can be no doubt that at a minimum they require that depriva-
tion of life, liberty or property by adjudication be preceded by notice and opportunity
for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.
Id at 313.
parties of the [pending action]." 9' Notice under the Code probably
satisfies the technical requirements of due process.92 In addition, a
notification procedure that the acquiring agency is mandated to fol-
low helps to prevent surprise to the condennee and provides him
with adequate time to prepare his case.9 3 Nevertheless, a more sub-
stantial, educative notice would insure a fairer trial.94
B. Factors Affecting Opportunity to be Heard
Due process requires a legitimate opportunity to be heard in
addition to adequate notice of the pending action.95 If a complicated
91. Id. at 314; Curtis v. Redevelopment Auth. of Philadelphia, 27 Pa. Commw. Ct. 360,
364-65, 367 A.2d 401, 403 (1976).
92. The Code allows service to be made personally or by certified mail. PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 26, § 1-405(b) (Purdon Supp. 1979-80). This comports with the standard enunciated in
Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112, 116 (1956). But cf. Mullane v. Central Hanover
Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) (due process is satisfied if service is made by
personal service whenever possible). See also UNIFORM EMINENT DOMAIN CODE § 406 (1975)
(adopts the Mullane standard).
The code requires that all preliminary objections to the declaration of taking be filed
within thirty days after the condemnee's receipt of notice or be deemed waived. PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 26, § 1-406(a) (Purdon Supp. 1979-80). One of these objections is to sufficiency or
lack of notice. The Code requires the condemnor to establish proof of service of notice, but
not proof of the adequacy of service. Id. § 1-405(e). Thus, if a condemnee receives inadequate
notice, a failure to respond constitutes a waiver. If the condemnee never learns of the proceed-
ing, the waiver should be invalid since the notice requirement of due process is unsatisfied.
Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112, 116 (1956).
93. Regulations promulgated by the Pennsylvania Attorney General stress notification.
"[Alt the earliest possible date prior to displacement," the acquiring agency is required to
provide each potentially displaced person with an "information statement" outlining the spe-
cial damage payments to which he may be entitled. This statement must also inform the po-
tentially displaced person of a grievance procedure during which grievances about eligibility
for payments will be heard by the acquiring agency. The agency must make available a re-
sponsible person who can advise the displaced person about the payments for which he may
apply and provide assistance in filling out and filing the necessary forms to receive these pay-
ments. 37 PA. CODE §§ 151.11, 151.12.
These regulations suffer the practical disability of being unenforceable. No means for
relief before dispossession exists if the acquiring agency does not abide by these regulations.
Additionally, even if the agency follows the regulations, the paper work and procedure re-
quired to get payment may preclude recovery for all but the most diligent.
94. Notice required under the Code must contain a statement to the effect that
[if] the condemnee wishes to challenge the power or right of the condemnor to appro-
priate the condemned property, the sufficiency of the security, the procedure followed
by the condemnor or the declaration of taking, he shall file preliminary objections
within thirty days after being served with notice of the condemnation.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-405(c)(12) (Purdon Supp. 1979-80). No requirement exists that the
notice be made understandable or genuinely informative.
The notice of condemnation should include a statement of all damages to which the con-
demnee may be entitled and a list of available free legal aid or an office where they may
inquire for assistance. See OR. REV. STAT. § 281.055(2) (1977). Cf. PA. R. Civ. P. 1018.1
(every complaint filed by a plaintiff must contain this wording in bold type: "You should take
this paper to your lawyer at once. If you do not have a lawyer or cannot afford one, go to or
telephone the office set forth below to find out where you can get legal help."). In addition, it
should furnish the condemnee with the opportunity to make a reasoned and intelligent choice
of whether to engage an attorney and pursue litigation. The object of notice is to afford the
opportunity to be fully and fairly heard. Thus, the condemnee must be provided with ample
opportunity to object to the sufficiency of notice at the viewers' hearing or subsequent trial.
Notice should not be waived by failing to file a preliminary objection.
95. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
and lengthy procedure or lack of resources precludes a complete ad-
judication of a claim, ample opportunity to be heard is severely com-
promised. Most condemnation cases that are actually litigated
concern commercial tenants who have access to legal counsel and
can better afford to litigate because they possess sufficient financial
assets. Since the residential tenant lacks these resources, he needs
greater protection.
C Analysis of Code Procedure
1. Condemnor's Right to Possession. -If the condemnee is dis-
possessed he encounters additional constraints on the exercise of his
rights.96 If forced to choose between litigating for a greater award or
accepting a smaller offer of payment of damages, the poorer con-
demnee is pressured to accept the condemnor's offer. The Code per-
mits the condemnor to take possession thirty days after the written
notice to the condennee simply upon a written offer to pay "esti-
mated just compensation."97 Some jurisdictions require prepay-
ment98 or a longer waiting period99 before the right to possession
vests in the condemnor.
Under the Code, required prepayment harms both the con-
demnor and condemnee. I°° To redress this harm without prejudic-
ing the rights of either party pro tanto payments of damages should
be made.' 0 1 In addition, an increased waiting period helps both the
96. The condemnor need only make an offer to pay estimated just compensation to be
entitled to possession. The offer can be accepted, however, without prejudice to the con-
demnee's right to any future recovery. If the condemnee refuses to relinquish possession, the
court will order a writ of possession unless the condemnee can show cause why the possession
should not be granted. If the condemnor has made payment to the condemnee or court and no
preliminary objections have been filed, the condemnee carries a heavy burden to show cause.
See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-407(a) (Purdon Supp. 1979-80). The right to possession will
not vest until the disposition of any preliminary objections. Valley Forge Golf Club v. Upper
Merion Twp., 422 Pa. 227, 231-32, 221 A.2d 292, 293 (1966) (concurring opinion); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 26, § 407(a) (Purdon Supp. 1979-80).
97. Federal courts have consistently held that no right of review of the condemnor's esti-
mate of just compensation exists. The rationale is that a separate review of the estimate and
the trial are duplicative. Pennsylvania courts have not adjudicated the question of judicial
review of the condemnor's estimate. See SNITZER, supra note 20, at § 402(a)-6. Nevertheless,
the tenant must have some mechanism to insure that the estimate is adequate since accepting it
may be his only practical alternative.
98. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 32-11-1-7 (Burns 1973) (possession upon payment to the
condemnee); cf. MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-30-311 (1979) (possession upon payment to the court
of estimated just compensation).
99. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 79, § 8B (West 1969) (four months); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 281.055 (1977) (ninety days).
100. When the condemnor overestimates payment to the condemnee and that payment is
made, the condemnee is never required to repay the excess. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-407(c)
(Purdon Supp. 1979-80). Therefore, to protect its interest the condemnor would rationally
undervalue the award. The condemnee must then litigate to receive full compensation.
101. By right, every tenant who qualifies as a displaced person is entitled to at least a $200
dislocation allowance and a moving allowance not exceeding $300. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26,
§§ 1-601A(a)(2), 1-604A(4) (Purdon Supp. 1979-80). Currently, however, no payment is re-
condemnee and condemnor. The additional time affords the tenant
a greater opportunity to find a suitable replacement dwelling before
being dispossessed. Consequently, the award paid by the con-
demnor may be smaller. !°2
An alternative to forcing the tenant to engage in the difficult
search for replacement housing is to require the condemnor to offer
adequate housing before dispossession. 0 3 The tenant would then be
assured a replacement dwelling. He should, however, be able to re-
fuse the condemnor's offer and find his own housing if he so
desires."° The adequacy of the condemnor's offer of housing must
be independently established,0 5 and the tenant should be entitled to
a pro lanio payment prior to dispossession."0 6 Nevertheless, in an
emergency situation the condemnor must be able to acquire posses-
sion quickly.' 7
ceived until the condemnee occupies an adequate replacement dwelling, unless he files and
qualifies under the "hardship" exemption. Payments under this exemption are made jointly to
the displaced condemnee and to an interested third party (e.g., lending institution or lessor) to
insure that the funds are used exclusively for resettlement. 37 PA. CODE § 151.8(a)(2).
Rather than being the exception, the early payments could be made as a matter of right.
A statement of information that notifies the condemnee of this right should be included in the
notice. The increased availability of the payment, however, will heighten the possibility of
fraud. Thus, the policy of joint payments should be continued. Additionally, if a payment is
fraudulently induced, both payees should suffer criminal sanctions.
102. If the tenant finds replacement housing before being dispossessed, no storage costs,
which are paid by the condemnor, are incurred. Redevelopment Auth. of Wilkes-Barre v.
Santucci, 20 Pa. Commw. Ct. 376, 380, 341 A.2d 533, 535 (1975) (storage costs are payable as
reasonable moving expenses).
103. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-12-8 (1974) (supporting this requirement).
104. Were this alternative adopted the method of paying the relocation housing allowance
should be changed in the event the tenant accepts the condemnor's offer. The allowance
should be based on the actual rent paid rather than being based on the cost of renting a com-
parable dwelling. For methods of payment in other situations, see note 69 supra.
105. To qualify for the replacement housing allowance, the tenant must occupy an ade-
quate replacement dwelling. Under the Code, the condemnor initially determines whether the
replacement dwelling is adequate. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-603A(b) (Purdon Supp.
1979-80); 37 PA. CODE §§ 151.11, 151.12. If the condemnor alone determines the adequacy of
its offer, the condemnee's interests are clearly jeopardized. Adequacy, then, must be measured
by some independent device.
The best method is to require that all dwellings offered meet the standards of the local
housing code or a model housing code promulgated by the state if no local code exists. Addi-
tionally, the new dwelling must be comparable in size to the former dwelling and provide
reasonable access to the condemnee's place of employment and to public and commercial
facilities. The condemnor should be entitled to protection only upon filing affidavits with the
court that prove that an offer was made in compliance with these standards or an affidavit
signed by the condemnee swearing that he has found a replacement dwelling. If the affidavits
are later proven to be false, the condemnee should be entitled to costs and attorney's fees. If
the condemnor's offer is adequate, he should not be required to pay storage fees. Since the
affidavits are easy to prove or disprove both the condemnor and tenant are protected.
106. See notes 100-101 and accompanying text supra. Adoption of the requirement that
the condemnor offer adequate replacement housing to the condemnee if he will be displaced
should not preclude the alternative of allowing the condemnee to remain in possession in lieu
of special damages.
107. See, e.g., United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373 (1945) (warehouse
taken because of wartime emergency).
2. Condemnee's Right to Payment-Under the Code the ten-
ant's right to payment of estimated just compensation vests sixty
days after the declaration of taking if the condemnee tenders posses-
sion. 10 8 The condemnor and condemnee, however, may agree to any
and all damages at any time, 1°9 but the tenant can never be guaran-
teed payment before dispossession.
3. The Hearing of the Viewers. -Any condemnee who is dissat-
isfied with the condemnor's estimate of just compensation may file
for an appointment of viewers. 110 Unless preliminary objections to
the validity of the condemnation or to jurisdiction' l are pending,
and warranting delay, the court will appoint three viewers," 12 at least
one of whom must be an attorney. 113 Two of the viewers must actu-
ally "view" the property. 1 4 Traditional due process adheres to the
service of notice and the viewers' hearing.' 15
The viewers' hearing is conducted without strict adherence to
formal rules of evidence.116 At the hearing, the condemnor must
present expert testimony concerning the amount of damages suffered
by the condemnee." 7 The significance of the viewers' hearing, how-
108. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-407(b) (Purdon Supp. 1979-80).
If the condemnor refuses to pay, the court, upon the petition of the condemnee, may order
the condemnor to file a declaration of estimated compensation. If the condemnor refuses to
comply, the court may order an impartial expert appraiser to estimate just compensation, costs
to be paid by the condemnor. After a hearing the court may enter judgment of the estimated
just compensation. Id
109. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-501 (Purdon Supp. 1979-80).
Generally, the condemnor wisely refuses separate settlement in a multiple interest valua-
tion. If one party settles and is overcompensated, the other parties' rights are not prejudiced.
Thus, the condemnor may pay more for the separate interests than the value of the entire
property. See SNITZER, supra note 20, at § 501.2.
If the condemnor cannot determine proper distribution of payment in a multiple interest
condemnation, it may petition the court to determine proper allocation. PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
26, § 1-522 (Purdon Supp. 1979-80).
110. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-502 (Purdon Supp. 1979-80).
1l1. Preliminary objections are filed after the notice of declaration of taking or after the
notice of the appointment of viewers. See id. §§ 1-406, 1-504. The preliminary objections that
may prevent an appointment of viewers are those directed to the declaration of taking. Note,
however, that an objection to jurisdiction in a de facto taking is filed after the appointment of
viewers. See Kattenbach v. City of Erie, 100 Pa. Super. Ct. 132 (1930).
112. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-504 (Purdon Supp. 1979-80).
113. Id. § 1-503.
114. Id. A "view" consists of going to the condemnation site and actually looking at the
property.
115. See id. § 1-505 (the wording mirrors the language of other code notice sections).
116. Id. § 1-70 1. Because of the relaxed rules of evidence, the tenant can present evidence
at the viewer's hearing without the aid of an attorney.
117. Id. § 1-702 (damages include special damages and leasehold valuation). The purpose
of this section is to force the condemnor to present evidence at the hearing. Under prior law,
the condemnor did not have this obligation. Therefore, the condemnee would hear the con-
demnor's evidence for the first time on appeal, having previously disclosed all of his figures at
the hearing. This section eliminates that patent unfairness. d. § 1-702 comment. By forcing
the condemnor to present an expert witness, the condemnee is either forced to hire an expert
witness or testify himself if he cannot afford the expert witness. The relaxed rules of evidence
encourage the condemnee to make a pro se presentation. The condemnee's presentation will
ever, is grossly undercut because the viewers' findings cannot be
presented as evidence on appeal." 8
4. Appealfrom the Viewers' A ward -Either party may appeal
the viewers' findings as a matter of right. 1 9 The appeal is a trial de
novo in the court of common pleas.' 20 All objections other than to
amount are settled preliminarily by the court.' 2 ' At the request of
either party the judge, or the judge and jury in a jury trial, 22 may
view the property. 23 The view is evidentiary.' 24  Additionally, the
condemnee, without further qualification, may testify as an expert
concerning the question of just compensation. 25  Even if the resi-
dential tenant can afford the appeal, however, the result is unpredict-
able because of the methods of valuation and allocation.
126
5. Costs.-A cost requirement, though valid on its face, may
offend due process because it forecloses a particular party's opportu-
nity to be heard.127 In certain circumstances, the Code provides for
reimbursement of all reasonable expenses and costs incurred.
28
Normally, the condemnee can receive up to $500 for reasonable at-
torney, appraisal, or engineering fees actually incurred. 29 The indi-
gent claimant can utilize free legal services, 130 and if he is without
the means to pay at the appellate level, can appeal in forma
be inferior to the condemnor's because of the condemnor's familiarity with the procedure and
its use of legal counsel and expert witnesses.
118. Id. § 1-703(3) (the report of the viewers and the amount of their award are inadmissi-
ble as evidence). If the condemnor does not prevail at the viewers' hearing, it has a natural
incentive to threaten appeal since even the threat of a costly appeal may force the tenant to
accept settlement because of his small compensable claim.
119. See Application of Smith, 381 Pa. 223, 112 A.2d 625 (1955).
120. See, e.g., Stoner v. Metropolitan Edison, 439 Pa. 333, 266 A.2d 718 (1970).
121. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-517 (Purdon Supp. 1979-80).
122. The eminent domain proceeding is poorly suited for a jury trial since questions of
allocation and fair market value are beyond the ken of the average juror. If consistent results
are a priority, the jury trial makes little sense.
123. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-704 (Purdon Supp. 1979-80).
124. Id. § 1-703 comment. If the condemnor has destroyed a building on the property,
however, no view should be taken. Redevelopment Auth. of Erie v. Pulakos, 17 Pa. Commw.
Ct. 251, 262, 330 A.2d 869, 878 (1975).
125. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-704 (Purdon Supp. 1979-80). See also Hoffman v. Com-
monwealth, 422 Pa. 144, 149, 221 A.2d 315, 319 (1966) (a lessee testifying on the basis of expert
reports qualifies as an expert). How much probative value the condemnee's own testimony
will have is questionable.
126. See notes 35-36 and accompanying text supra.
127. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 380 (1971).
128. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §§ 1-408, 1-609 (Purdon Supp. 1979-80) (when the con-
demnor discontinues the proceeding or when the condemnee proves a de facto taking the con-
demnee is entitled to costs and expenses).
129. Id. § 1-610. Without statutory authorization, engineering and attorney's fees are not
reimbursed. In re Kling, 433 Pa. 118, 121, 249 A.2d 552, 554 (1969).
130. The efficacy of free legal services is diminished because the poor often solicit aid at
the eleventh hour. Furthermore, free legal service programs suffer from a high turnover and
are staffed by young and inexperienced attorneys. Katz, Lawyersfor the Poor in Transition, 12
LAW & Soc. REv. 275 (1978). Free legal aid, therefore, is no panacea.
pauperis.'31 Under no circumstances should the condemnee be de-
nied access to the courts because of his inability to pay the costs.
Providing for an automatic reimbursement of costs will not best
protect the tenant's interests. This practice encourages needless and
protracted litigation. Instead, the emphasis of the Code must be on a
quick and equitable disposition of the case, a goal that can be
achieved by altering the viewers' hearing.
IV. A Modest Proposal
The essential purposes of the viewers' hearing are to provide an
accessible forum to adjudicate condemnation disputes quickly and to
avoid unnecessary and costly litigation. The nature of the proceed-
ing itself, however, pressures the condemnor to appeal, which forces
the condemnee to settle. The condemnor is not required to make
any real effort to negotiate, and can dispossess the condennee after
only an offer to pay an estimated just compensation. If the result of
the viewers' hearing is undesirable, an appeal resulting in a trial de
novo can be taken by the condemnor. For the residential tenant, the
costs of court litigation may exceed the potential recovery. An early
settlement is the rational choice. The condemnor can with little re-
straint determine the "just" compensation for the residential ten-
ant.' 32 Therefore, only an alteration in procedure will effectuate the
essential purposes of the viewers' hearing.
The procedure must encourage an equitable pretrial settlement.
Under the Code the condemnee is induced to settle his claim by the
potential for protracted and costly litigation and a dispossession
without payment. Three changes will enhance the prospects of an
equitable prehearing settlement. The condemnor must be required
to negotiate in good faith.133 Additionally, the condemnor must be
denied possession until he offers the condemnee a replacement
dwelling. 134 Finally, pro lanto payments must be made as early as is
feasible. '35
131. PA. R. App. PRoc. 551, 552.
132. The landlord may decide to appeal, but if the tenant is impoverished a settlement for
ready cash is more beneficial than a higher award postponed until the disposition of the ap-
peal.
133. Negotiations in good faith must include the following steps. First, the condemnor
must provide the condemnee with a written statement of its estimated just compensation with
an itemized breakdown describing how it arrived at the figure ofjust compensation. See UNI-
FORM EMINENT DoMAIN CODE § 203 (1975). Second, the condemnor must supply the con-
demnee with a schedule of special damages or other benefits, state or federal, for which he may
be eligible. Third, the condemnor must supply the addresses and telephone numbers of free
legal services in the area. By requiring the condemnor to provide a basis for the condemnee to
make an informed judgment on potential recovery and projected costs, society avoids unneces-
sary litigation and unfair settlements.
134. If the condenmee needs money to move, dispossession could force an inadequate
settlement. See notes 103-07 and accompanying text supra
135. See notes 100-01 and accompanying text supra.
Moreover, greater significance must be attached to the viewers'
hearing. The panel should be composed of two expert real estate
appraisers and an attorney. 36 Their findings on damages and allo-
cation must not be excluded from evidence at a subsequent trial.1
37
The legislature 138 should adopt these changes to encourage fair and
equitable pretrial settlement.
IV. Conclusion
To adequately perform its function, the eminent domain proce-
dure must guarantee the opportunity for the condemnee to receive
just compensation for his property that is taken, injured, or de-
stroyed. With valuation of his leasehold interest uncertain, the resi-
136. Having appraisers as viewers is advantageous in several ways. Condemnation in-
volves questions best handled by appraisal experts since the method of valuation is primarily
economic and not legal. The Code recognizes this by making the experts key witnesses at trial.
Appraisers can articulate reasoned results that can be the basis of later valuation and alloca-
tion settlements.
The Code correctly recognizes the importance of having an attorney on the board of view-
ers. The viewers are empowered to rule on questions of fact and conclusions of law, an inquiry
requiring legal expertise. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-511(9) (Purdon Supp. 1979-80). Addi-
tionally, since the viewers' hearing could be a final determination of the rights of the parties,
due process must be observed. Only the attorney is aware of the subtleties of due process.
These appraisal services are costly, however. If the condemnee is required to pay for the
expert appraisers the cost may effectively preempt the option of utilizing expert appraisers as
viewers. The cost should be paid by the state with reimbursement by the condemnor if negoti-
ations are not made in good faith. Little difficulty will arise when the state is the condemnor
since the appraisers are appointed by the court and payment is made regardless of outcome.
The Code also recognizes that impartial expert appraisers can be appointed by the court and
paid by the state as condemnor. See id. § 1-407(b). Procedures must be established to assure
that the state pays only reasonable appraisal fees. To receive payment, the appraiser should be
required to file a strict accounting of the hours spent both on the appraisal and at the hearing.
Both parties, however, should still pay reasonable costs to prevent an automatic petition
for the appointment of viewers and a derogation of the settlement process. Reasonable costs
should not be so high as to preclude either party's option of petitioning for a viewers' hearing.
137. Circulation and publication of the viewers' findings provides a standard for future
reference. Because of the predictability of result, settlement will become more reasoned and
recourse to both the viewers' hearing and trial less likely. Thus, the cost of appraisal fees
should not be burdensome on the state. See Levy, The Role ofthe Real Estate Appraiser in
Arbitration, 33 ARB. J. 10 (1978). The standard for admitting the viewers' findings should be
the same as that governing the admissible testimony of expert witnesses at trial. See PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 26, § 1-705(2) (Purdon Supp. 1979-80). Additionally, since the viewers' findings
would be admissible, improvident resort to trial would be less likely.
138. If the legislature does not have the power to make these changes, arguments over the
merits of the changes are moot. In analyzing whether it has this power, a comparison with the
medical malpractice arbitration system is instructive. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §§ 1301.101-
.1006 (Purdon Supp. 1979-80). The central issue is whether separation of powers is violated by
the admission of the viewers' findings as evidence at a trial de novo. Under the medical mal-
practice arbitration system the findings of the arbitration board are admissible at a trial de
novo. The standard is that if the burden is not shifted and the jury is the final arbiter of the
issues raised, the admission of evidence is constitutional. Parker v. Children's Hosp. of Phila-
delphia, 483 Pa. 106, 122-23, 394 A.2d 932, 940-41 (1978). To fit within this test, the admission
of viewers' findings must simply be governed by the standard by which the expert witness
testifies. See PA. STAT. ANN . § 1-705(2) (Purdon Supp. 1979-80). The viewers' findings admit-
ted at trial must have the same evidentiary value as the testimony of an expert witness. Thus,
the indigent condemnee appellee can use the evidence of the viewers' findings in place of the
costly expert's testimony.
dential tenant is denied ready access to just compensation by a
costly, complex procedure.
The procedure can be changed without disrupting the process.
The key to this change is the adoption and dissemination of a clear
method of valuation and allocation in a multiple interests context. A
rational basis for pretrial settlement is then established, and the fo-
cus of the procedure can be shifted from litigation to pretrial settle-
ment with a resultant savings in time and expense for all parties
concerned.
The Code does not safeguard the fragile interests of the residen-
tial tenant. The suggested changes guarantee the residential tenant
the opportunity to receive just compensation.
DON A. LEATHERMAN

